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Abstract
When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with
simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling
“expectation damages” close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of
contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to lower informational requirements
of courts, parties may opt for a "specific performance" regime which grants the
breached-against buyer an option to choose "restitution" if the tender’s value falls
below some (exogenously given) quality threshold. In order to implement this
regime, no more information needs to be verifiable than is implicitly assumed in
Che and Hausch (1999).
Keywords: breach remedies, incomplete contracts, cooperative investments.
JEL-Classification: K12, L22, J41, C70
1 Introduction
When parties in bilateral trade make relationship-specific investments which have little
value to third parties, markets do not protect them against opportunistic expropriation
by their trading partner. This is when contracts are potentially useful. Yet, if we assume
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that contracts are inherently incomplete, they might not offer enough protection. As a
result, the danger of hold-up would lead parties to invest less than the socially optimal
level (Williamson 1979, 1985; Grout, 1984; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore,
1988).
In response to this result of underinvestment, a large body of literature on contractual
solutions to the hold-up problem has developed. By showing that simple (incomplete)
contracts can achieve the first best in many situations, the literature argues that the
incompleteness of contracts might not pose too serious a problem. There are two strands
of this literature.
One strand considers the special informational environment of Hart and Moore (1988),
who assume that it is impossible to contract on any investment-related information in-
cluding quality of output. It shows that simple contracts can solve the hold-up problem
if specific investments are selfish in nature. This is the case where, for example, a seller
invests in order to reduce her cost or a buyer invests in order to increase his benefit from
the procured good or service (Chung, 1991; Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 1994; Nöldeke
and Schmidt, 1995; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996). Yet, these results do not carry over to
the case of a supplier investing to adapt products to the buyer’s special needs. Indeed,
Che and Hausch (1999) show that contracts are completely useless in protecting such
purely cooperative investments, if it is impossible to rule out ex-post renegotiation.1
The other strand of the literature is less explicit about informational assumptions and
mainly concerned with the impact of the standard breach remedies of contract law on
the efficiency of specific investments. Starting with the seminal papers of Shavell (1980,
1984) and Rogerson (1984), this literature asks how these breach remedies interact with
simple contracts specifying little more than the good to be exchanged and the price to
be paid (essentialia negotii). It often concludes that achieving the first best is possible.
Two such efficiency results exist for cooperative investments. Che and Chung (1999)
show that, with costless renegotiation, a simple contract, which does not condition on
investment, achieves the first best if the contract is governed by a regime of “reliance
1We borrow the term “cooperative investments” from Che and Hausch (1999). They were first studied
in an incomplete contract setting by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and are also referred to as “cross
investments” (e.g. Guriev, 2003) or “investments with externalities” (e.g. Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1995).
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damages”. This is a standard remedy of contract law under which the court orders the
breaching buyer to reimburse the seller all his investments. Schweizer (2006) shows that
a regime of “bilateral expectation damages” also achieves the first best even in bilateral
investment problems, seemingly contradicting Che and Chung (1999) who argue that
“expectation damages” do not induce any cooperative investments. Under this remedy,
the court orders the breaching party to compensate the victim such that the latter is in
as good a position as if the contract had been performed. The difference in results stems
from Schweizer’s assumption that the contract also specifies investments and that parties
accordingly can claim damages if the counter party underinvested relative to the level
stipulated in the contract.
The puzzling coexistence of the "irrelevance of contracting" result in Che and Hausch
(1999) and the "first-best" results in Che and Chung (1999) and Schweizer (2006) can be
explained by the latter papers’ (implicit) relaxing of informational assumptions. In order
to enforce “reliance damages”, investments have to be verifiable in court. Yet then, it
is not very surprising from the perspective of contract theory that the first best should
be feasible. Indeed, parties could also directly condition on investments in their original
contract. For “bilateral expectation damages”, also the buyer’s valuation would have to
be verifiable. Then, however, it follows from principal-agency theory that risk neutral
parties in unilateral investment settings will always be able to achieve the first best (e.g.
Holmström, 1979).2 Still, the point is that efficiency is induced by real-world institutions
of contract law, rather than by some fancy mechanism or forcing contract. The fact,
however, that different contract remedies with very different informational requirements
for enforcement are compared on equal footing reveals a rather cavalier attitude towards
informational problems. In fact, this strand of literature simply assumes that courts
possess all relevant information.
Given that courts will not always be equally able to apply different breach remedies,
our aim is to be precise regarding the informational requirements of the institutional
solutions we propose. Throughout the paper, we shall not stick to the explicit infor-
2Indeed, principal-agent literature has long been concerned with what Che and Hausch (1999) have
called “cooperative investments” in the bilateral trade literature.
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mational environment of Hart and Moore (1988) and Che and Hausch (1999) for two
reasons. First, while certainly a very interesting polar case, it would imply that none of
the standard breach remedies could be applied, except for “specific performance” (which
only requires the court to enforce the contract).3 This, however, seems very restrictive for
many purposes. Second, and more subtle, it is inconceivable how courts should be able
to verify whether a widget was traded or not, without being able to tell a widget from
a non-widget. In other words, by assuming that courts can observe whether trade has
occurred or not, Che and Hausch (1999) implicitly assume that courts are able to verify
whether the good in question exceeds a certain minimal quality threshold. This is still
much less than assuming that courts can observe the gains of trade for every possible re-
alization of the good’s quality level. Yet, it is enough for their “irrelevance of contracting
result” to no longer apply and, as we shall show in Section 5, to even achieve first-best
levels of cooperative investments.4
We proceed by first revisiting “expectation damages”, which is the default remedy of
common law within the same framework as Che and Chung (1999). Expectation damages
compensate the victim of breach in the amount of profit that he would have received had
the contract been duly performed. Che and Chung (1999) show that it performs very
badly inducing zero cooperative investments. This result, however, follows from their
implicit assumption that the contract stays silent in terms of required quality. Yet, this will
often not be the case. Even if the parties do not stipulate anything explicit as to quality in
their contract (express warranty), the court will do it for them by default, e.g. by requiring
the good to serve its ordinary purpose (implied warranty of merchantability).5 Taking
this feature of real world contracting into account, we can show that expectation damages
will always induce positive levels of cooperative investments. Indeed, it is even possible
3In this sense Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) provide a result which is interesting for both strands of
the literature when they speak of “specific performance”. Yet, they also give results for "expectation
damages".
4However, the problems identified in Che and Hausch (1999) reappear, if quality is multidimensional
and courts fail to take into account all quality dimensions when deciding whether the good exceeds
minimal quality.
5See Section 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The analysis of Che and
Chung (1999) continues to apply if parties contract arround implicit warranties without replacing them
with "express warranties". Moreover, in labour contracts, stipulating a required quality level might not
be possible as a matter of law.
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to achieve the first best by writing so-called Cadillac contracts (Edlin, 1996) which define
the highest possible quality level as the quality required under the contract.6 This result
holds, even if, because of non-verifiability of investments, both “bilateral expectation
damages” as proposed by Schweizer (2006) and “reliance damages” as advocated by Che
and Chung (1999) are not available. Hence, as the default regime already induces the first
best, there is generally no need for privately stipulated reliance damages, as proposed by
Che and Chung (1999).
Still, reliance damages could be preferable for informational reasons. Expectation
damages require the gains of trade to be verifiable. This imposes a considerable informa-
tional burden on courts. It will, however, depend on the circumstances whether reliance
damages fare any better. Although accounting data is available, verifying investment is
notoriously difficult. Contractors will always have the incentive to mischarge and misal-
locate costs. Karpoff and Vendrzyk (1999) report that “a total of seven different agencies
monitor defense contractors to assure compliance with DOD [Department of Defense]
regulations”. Moreover, many “fraud investigations are triggered by audits of contrac-
tor’s cost accounting records by the DOD’s Defense Contract Audit Agency” (p. 812).
Hence, even if there is evidence of the use of reliance damages as reported by Che and
Chung (1999), the evidence also reveals the need for costly monitoring on the part of the
Department of Defense.
Furthermore, reliance damages are not the only alternative if parties doubt whether
courts possess enough information to enforce expectation damages. Consider a regime,
which allows the buyer to choose between “specific performance” and “restitution” if the
tender’s value is below some threshold, and lets parties enforce the contract otherwise
6Edlin (1996) also analyses Cadillac contracts in the context of expectation damages but makes a
different point. He considers a setting where the seller makes selfish investments. In the absence of a
contract, there will be underinvestment due to the hold-up problem. If, however, the contract stipulates
the highest possible quality/quantity and it is the buyer who breaches the contract, the seller will
overinvest. This is because he is fully insured and fails to take into account the states of the world where
it is inefficient to trade (This is a version of the "overreliance" result by Shavell (1984) who implictly
assumes Cadillac contracts by modelling the trade decision as binary). To solve this problem, Edlin
(1996) proposes to set the price so low, that it will always be the investing seller who breaches the
contract. That makes him the residual claimant and provides him with efficient investment incentives.
Yet, in order to make the seller accept a contract with such a low price, the buyer has to pay the seller a
lump sum up front. By contrast, in our model, we are concerned with cooperative investments and need
not rely on any up-front payments.
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(SPR-regime). Under restitution, the parties are discharged of their duties under the
contract, and the buyer recovers any progress payments that he might have made to the
seller. As we will show, this regime also achieves the first best but, compared to expecta-
tion damages, lowers informational requirements considerably. Instead of observing the
gains of trade for every possible realization of the tender’s quality level, the court merely
has to observe whether the tender’s value is higher or lower than some exogenously given
threshold. As we have argued before, this regime requires no more information to be veri-
fiable than is implicitly assumed by Che and Hausch (1999). While it is difficult, even for
an expert, to assess the absolute gains of trade in any possible instance, it should be rel-
atively easy for him to testify whether the good is better or worse than some well-chosen
benchmark. Whenever this poses fewer problems than verifying the absolute value of the
seller’s investment, we argue that parties who contemplate privately stipulated remedies,
should use SPR instead of reliance damages.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, we
work out two benchmarks: the socially optimal level of investment and the investment
level absent of institutional arrangements. In Section 4, we show that expectation dam-
ages induce first-best levels of cooperative investments. Our results pertaining to the
optional remedy regime which generally grants the parties specific performance but al-
lows the buyer to choose between specific performance and restitution if the good is
non-conforming (SPR) is derived in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
A buyer and a seller potentially trade a good. Both parties are risk neutral. In the
first period, the seller makes a relationship-specific cooperative investment, e ∈ R+0 . The
buyer’s benefit from trade, v, is a random variable stochastically determined by the
amount of the seller’s investment, e, measured in money terms. The scrap or resale value
of the good to the seller is 0.7 The cost of the seller’s performance is deterministic and
equal to a known constant, c > 0. That is, the seller’s investment is cooperative, and
there are no selfish investments. This setting is identical to the setting studied in Che
7Consequently there cannot be a threat point effect like in Edlin and Hermalin (2000).
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and Chung (1999).
The timing of the model, depicted in Figure 1, is as follows: At date 0, the buyer
and the seller sign a contract. The contract specifies a fixed price p to be paid by the
buyer upon performance as stipulated in the contract. It also specifies a quality level
v¯ and a lump sum payment t made by the seller to the buyer. At date 1, the seller
makes a cooperative investment: e ≥ 0. At date 2, the buyer’s benefit from the seller’s
performance, v, is drawn from [0, vh] by the distribution function F (· |e). The seller’s
cost of performance is deterministic and equal to c, where 0 ≤ c < vh. At date 3, the
parties play a breach game, in which they announce their willingness to deliver or accept
the good and choose among the available breach remedies. This game will be explained
in more detail below.
D ate 0 D ate 1
Buyer and
seller sign a
contract.
T hen the seller
m akes an
investment.
D ate 2
T he buyer's benefit
from trade is 
realized.
D ate 3
Parties play a
breach game.
D ate 4
T rade decision
is finalized and
payoffs are
realized.
 Possible renegotia tion
Figure 1: Timeline.
We assume that renegotiation has no associated costs and can occur at any time after
date 3 and before the seller actually performs at date 4. The parties split the surplus
from renegotiation at an exogenously given fixed ratio, with the seller receiving a share
α ∈ [0, 1].8 Under this assumption, the buyer’s choice of legal remedy can be reversed
whenever reversing it is mutually beneficial for both parties.
As a leading example, consider a car manufacturer who contracts with an engineering
firm to develop the motor for a new car. Assume that the development of the motor
roughly consists of two stages: A design stage, where a prototype is developed; and
an engineering stage, which prepares for production. If the parties sign a contract, the
engineering firm will first invest into R&D to come up with a prototype. The quality
of the prototype will tend to rise as investment into the design process increases. After
8The same ex-post bargaining setup was used by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996).
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the quality of the prototype becomes apparent, the parties decide whether to proceed to
the engineering stage. This decision will be made in the shadow of the available legal
remedies that define the threat points in negotiations.
Different legal remedies require different information to be verifiable. In the case of
expectation damages (ED) the court must observe the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s
variable cost. For restitution (R), it must be observable whether the buyer’s benefit
from performance lies below or above a certain threshold level v¯. In the case of specific
performance (SP), the court must only observe whether delivery has occurred. We assume
that the court cannot verify the seller’s investment. The seller’s choice of investment
may be private information. Everything else, however, is observable by the parties. The
following technical assumptions are made throughout:
Assumption 1 F (· |·) is twice continuously differentiable.
Assumption 2 Fe (· |e) < 0 and Fee (· |e) > 0 for all v in (0, vh) and for all e ≥ 0.
Assumption 3 Fe (v |0) = −∞ and Fe (v |∞) = 0 for all v in (0, vh).
Assumption 2 means that an increase in e moves the distribution in the sense of the
first-order stochastic dominance at a decreasing rate, while Assumption 3 ensures an
interior solution.
3 Benchmark
As a benchmark, we consider the first-best outcome. It has two components: (i) the
efficient trade decision has trade occur if and only if v ≥ c, and (ii) the efficient investment
level e0, maximizes the net expected gains from trade, conditional on the efficient trade
decision:
e0 ∈ argmaxW (e) ≡
∫
vh
c
(v − c) Fv (v |e) dv − e. (1)
Integrating (1) by parts, the efficient investment level, e0, is characterized by the
following first-order condition:
W ′ (e0) = −
∫
vh
c
Fe (v |e0 ) dv − 1 = 0. (2)
8
If parties do not contract but simply bargain at date 3, they will split the gains of
trade according to their respective bargaining power. The seller’s expected payoff will
then be:
Un(e) ≡ α
∫
vh
c
(v − c) Fv (v |e) dv − e. (3)
Integrating by parts and differentiating, we can write the first-order condition for the
seller’s optimal investment decision en:
U ′n(en) ≡ −α
∫
vh
c
Fe (v |en ) dv − 1 = 0 (4)
As Fe (v |·) < 0 and Fee (v |·) > 0, it can be seen that the seller underinvests: en < e0.
By Assumptions 2 and 3, both e0 and en are unique, finite, and strictly positive.
4 Expectation damages
4.1 Renegotiation impossible
First consider the game that is induced by the expectation damages remedy which is
widely held to be the default remedy in the US. Under this rule, the breaching party has
to compensate his counter party such that the latter is in as good a position as if the
former party had fully performed.
Therefore, after quality v of the prototype is realized, the supplier faces the follow-
ing decision: If he chooses to deliver the good (D), he receives the trade price, incurs
production or supply costs, and has to compensate the buyer for having breached the
contract if quality is below the required quality level v¯. Hence the supplier’s payoff is
p− c− [v¯ − v]+, where we shall frequently use the notation [·]+ = max[·, 0]. If he chooses
not to deliver (D¯), and making the natural assumption that c < p < v¯,9 he merely has to
9Absent up-front payments and assuming that the parties write first-best contracts (v¯ = vh see below),
this assumption directly follows from the parties’ participation constraints. For all v¯ < vh, however, the
assumption implies the buyer’s share in the gains of trade to be at least:∫
vh
v¯
(v − v¯) dF (v |e ) > 0.
Without up-front payments, it is therefore not possible to find a p < v¯ which allows to achieve any
possible distribution of the ex-ante gains of trade for all v¯. Still, as a matter of real world contracting,
p < v¯ seems to be a natural assumption, as courts tend to set v¯ higher as the price increases. There may
even be a trade-off between efficiency and the distribution of the gains of trade according to the parties’
bargaining power.
9
N v v<v v≥
D D
( )v p
v p
− −
−
p c
v p
−
−
D D
( )p c v v
v p
− − −
−
( )v p
v p
− −
−
S S
: 0S e ≥
Figure 2: Subgame induced by ED starting with the seller’s investment decision.
pay the buyer damages of v¯ − p (Figure 2). Note, that the court will calculate damages
with respect to v¯ because this is the quality that the supplier was required to deliver
under the contract.10
It is easy to see that in subgame perfect equilibrium, the seller will take the efficient
delivery decision, choosing to deliver whenever the value of the good is higher than
variable cost of production, v > c. The seller’s expected payoff is therefore:
UED(e) ≡ − (v¯ − p) F (c |e) +
∫
v¯
c
[p− c− (v¯ − v)] Fv (v |e) dv (5)
+
∫
vh
v¯
(p− c) Fv (v |e) dv − e.
Rearranging and differentiating, we get the following first-order condition for the level
of investment eED which maximizes the seller’s payoff:
U ′
ED
(eED) = −
∫
v¯
c
Fe (v |eED ) dv − 1 = 0. (6)
Comparing this expression with the benchmark condition (2) and observing that
U ′′
ED
(e) < 0 by Assumption 2, Proposition (1) immediately follows:
Proposition 1 If renegotiation is impossible, expectation damages induce positive levels
of cooperative investments. Underinvestment is generally the norm, yet investment in-
centives rise in required quality v¯. If parties set required quality such that it cannot be
10We have implicitly made the simplifying assumption that the buyer always accepts delivery. In
Appendix A, we show that the analysis of this and the following subsection does not change if we allow
both the seller and the buyer to breach.
10
met with positive probability, v¯ ≥ vh (Cadillac contract, see Edlin, 1996), expectation
damages implement the first best.
Remark 1 If v¯ ≥ vh the parties can achieve any distribution of the ex-ante gains of
trade without making use of up-front payments.
The intuition for this result is the following. If the good is non-conforming to the
contract, any increase in the quality level above variable cost benefits the seller by reduc-
ing his damage payment v¯ − v. If however, the good is conforming to the contract, the
seller receives a fixed payoff p− c, irrespective of how much the realized level of quality
exceeds the threshold level v¯. Hence, the seller does not fully internalize the benefit of his
investment and consequently underinvests relative to the socially optimal level. Yet, as
v¯ increases, the range of valuations for which the benefit of investing is not internalized
shrinks, and investment incentives improve until they finally reach first best levels for
v¯ = vh.
11
Our result stands in contrast to Proposition 1 of Che and Chung (1999), who conclude
that expectation damages induce zero cooperative investments if renegotiation is not
possible. This follows from their implicit assumption that the contract remains silent
about required quality (v¯ = 0). Yet, in practice, even if the parties do not stipulate
anything explicit regarding quality in their contract, the court will often, by default,
do it for them (see Section 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code). In our
example of the car manufacturer, the court would at least require the motor to work
or to match the performance criteria of a reference product. However, the analysis of
Che and Chung (1999) continues to apply to cases where the parties waive the warranty
of merchantability without substituting it with an express warranty. Moreover, it is
sometimes not possible as a matter of law to stipulate levels of required quality in labour
contracts. As we will show in the next subsection, we can get a similar result when we
allow for renegotiation.
11Another way to see this is that, for v¯ = vh, the seller’s payoff will always be the joint payoff minus
a constant term of v¯ − p. This makes the seller a residual claimant.
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Figure 3: Subgame induced by expectation damages with renegotiation.
4.2 Renegotiation possible
If renegotiation is possible, adjustments to the payoffs in Figure 2 need to be made.12
If v < v¯, it is still optimal for the seller to announce delivery for v ≥ c and to breach
the contract for v < c. Hence, the seller’s equilibrium payoffs will be p − c − (v¯ − v)
and − (v¯ − p) respectively, just as in the case without renegotiation. If v ≥ v¯, however,
equilibrium payoffs may change. Assuming that c < p < v¯, the seller will breach the
contract if:
v >
v¯ − c
α
+ c ≡ x (v¯) . (7)
Intuitively imagine that an engineering firm develops a motor which is much better than
required under the contract, v >> v¯. By breaching the contract, it only has to pay
damages of v¯ − p. This may be less than the seller’s share in the renegotiation surplus
of α (v − c). Hence, the seller will have an incentive to strategically breach the contract
for high realizations of v. Consequently, the seller’s equilibrium payoffs will be p− c for
v ≤ x (v¯) and − (v¯ − p)+α(v− c) for v > x (v¯). Of course, the latter case can only occur
for
x (v¯) < vh ⇐⇒ v¯ < α(vh − c) + c ≡ vˆ ≤ vh, (8)
which will never be the case for sufficiently high levels of required quality v¯. The seller’s
12We follow Che and Chung (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) in assuming that the possibility of
renegotiation influences the parties’ breach decision. This implies that the parties anticipate being able
to renegotiate after the court’s decisions. In Rogerson (1984) parties can only renegotiate prior to going
to court.
12
expected payoff is therefore:
U
ED
(e) ≡ − (v¯ − p) F (c |e) +
∫
v¯
c
[p− c− (v¯ − v)] Fv (v |e) dv (9)
+
∫
x(v¯)
v¯
(p− c) Fv (v |e) dv +
∫
vh
x(v¯)
[− (v¯ − p) + α (v − c)] Fv (v |e) dv − e.
Rearranging and differentiating, we get the following first-order condition for the
investment decision e
ED
which maximizes the seller’s expected payoff:
−
∫
v¯
c
Fe (v |eED) dv − a
∫
vh
x(v¯)
Fe (v |eED ) dv − 1 = 0. (10)
We can write the following proposition:13
Proposition 2 If required quality is low (v¯ < vˆ ⇐⇒ x (v¯) < vh), expectation damages
induce higher levels of cooperative investments if renegotiation is possible than if it is not.
The seller will underinvest, yet investment incentives increase in required quality v¯. As
required quality rises above a certain threshold, v¯ ≥ vˆ, incentives under either assumption
coincide. Cadillac contracts implement the first best.
Proof. The proposition immediately follows from comparing expression (10) with
expressions (6) and (2), observing that x (v¯) > v¯ for all v¯. As for the claim that investment
incentives rise in v¯, note that it follows from x (v) ≥ v¯ that
de
ED
dv
=
−Fe (v |eED ) + Fe (x (v) |eED )∫
v¯
c
Fee (v |eED) dv + α
∫
vh
x(v¯)
Fee (v |eED ) dv
≥ 0.
where the inequality is strict for α = 1.
The intuition for the higher investment incentives under renegotiation is that the seller
internalizes some of the benefit of his investment even if quality is conforming (v > v¯).
This is because, following a strategic breach, the seller gets a share of the renegotiation
surplus which increases in quality.
4.3 Discussion
The results of this section are summarized in Figure 4. The "zero investment result" of
Che and Chung (1999) follows as a polar case where the level of required quality is set
13This result stands in contrast to Proposition 4 of Che and Chung (1999).
13
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Figure 4: Incentives induced by expectation damages.
to zero. In this case, the seller’s tender will always be conforming to the contract and
the seller receives a fixed payment of p − c independent of the realized level of quality.
Hence, he does not internalize any benefit from his investment. However, as required
quality is set above variable cost, levels of cooperative investments will be positive as
the seller can reduce his expected damage payments by investing into quality. Moreover,
if renegotiations are possible, writing a contract always improves on the situation of
writing no contract at all. As the level of required quality rises, the value of renegotiation
decreases and eventually completely subsides. Cadillac contracts finally induce the first
best level of cooperative investments independent of the possibility of renegotiation.
A real world example of such Cadillac contracts would be the contracts offered by
moving companies.14 They usually promise to deliver all their client’s belongings to
his new residence intact. This is as valuable as the company’s performance can be, as
most of the time, the company falls short of its promise and will have to compensate its
client. Yet, we do not seem to generally observe such contracts in reality. In our example
of the car manufacturer, parties would not normally agree on a motor that cannot be
built at the current state of technology. This might make the results of Propositions
1 and 2 unappealing as a positive theory of how parties induce first-best cooperative
investments.15 Still, it is reassuring that expectation damages as the default common law
14This example is due to Edlin (1996).
15It can, however, be shown that an optional regime which is based on expectation damages for partial
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remedy at least induce positive levels of such investments. Moreover, the first-best result
could still qualify as a normative theory on how parties should write contracts.
5 SPR with renegotiation
Expectation damages require that the gains of trade be verifiable. This imposes a con-
siderable informational burden on courts. If parties doubt whether courts possess the
necessary information to enforce expectation damages, we show that they can use a rem-
edy regime which considerably lowers informational requirements while still achieving
the first best. It combines the restitution remedy (R) with specific performance (SP).
Under the regime (SPR), both the seller and the buyer can have the contract enforced
if the tender is conforming to the contract, v ≥ v¯. In this case, the seller incurs cost of
c, delivers the good of quality v to the buyer, and receives the agreed upon price p in
return. Whenever the court’s order to perform would result in inefficient trade, the par-
ties renegotiate and split the renegotiation surplus [c− v]+ according to their respective
bargaining power.16 In the case where quality is non-conforming, v < v¯, the buyer can
either insist on performance (such that the payoffs are as just described) or terminate
the contract and ask for restitution.17 Termination discharges all remaining obligations
under the contract and restitution allows the buyer to recover any progress payment he
might have made to the seller. As we assumed that the good does not have any value for
the seller, each party would end up with 0 payoff. Yet, once again, parties will renegotiate
whenever there is a positive renegotiation surplus, [v − c]+.
In our example, this means that if the prototype is satisfactory, both the engineering
firm and the car manufacturer can have the contract enforced, i.e., the second stage
breach but also allows the buyer to terminate the contract if the tender is non-conforming can achieve
the first best without having to write Cadillac contracts. This regime broadly applies in both common
and civil law for situations where the seller is excused for non-performance.
16As both the specific performance and restitution remedy do not automatically lead to ex-post efficient
trade, there is no hope to achieve first-best unless renegotiation is possible.
17Strictly speaking, under the perfect tender rule, the court will examine if the tender corresponds to
the quality features stipulated in the contract. Therefore, in theory, a buyer could terminate and ask for
termination even if the non-conforming tender is better than a conforming one. Yet, courts are likely
to deny termination in such a case, especially if parties have not defined in detail the product’s quality
features. In this case, the court has to decide ex post whether the tender is conforming, i.e., whether it
corresponds to the quality features that the parties hypothetically would have written into the contract.
It is inconceivable that this decision would not be strongly influenced by whether the product delivers
good value to the client or not.
15
[ ]
(1 )[ ]
v c
v c
α
α
+
+
−
− −
SP R
: 0S e ≥
BNv v≥ v v<B
non-conformingconforming
[ ]
(1 )[ ]
p c c v
v p c v
α
α
+
+
− + −
− + − −
[ ]
(1 )[ ]
p c c v
v p c v
α
α
+
+
− + −
− + − −
SP
Figure 5: Subgame induced by SPR.
of the project will be realized, unless parties renegotiate. However, if the prototype is
unsatisfactory, the manufacturer has the option to either terminate the contract or to
continue to insist on performance. Figure 5 represents the subgame starting from the
seller’s investment decision. We go on to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Consider a regime which lets the buyer choose between specific perfor-
mance and restitution if the tender’s value is below a certain threshold value v¯, and
otherwise grants the parties specific performance. Then, for any given threshold value
v¯ ∈ [c, vh), there exists a price pSPR which induces first-best cooperative investments.
Under an additional assumption, the result extends to threshold values v¯ ∈ (0, c).
Proof. Assume that the quality threshold is set above or equal to variable cost,
v¯ ≥ c. For conforming quality, v ≥ v¯, this implies that no renegotiation surplus arises
under specific performance. Payoffs are simply p − c and v − p for the seller and the
buyer, respectively. For non-conforming quality, v < v¯, termination will be optimal for
the buyer if:
(1− α) [v − c]+ > v − p+ (1− α) [c− v]+ ⇐⇒ v <
p− (1− α) c
α
≡ vˇ (p) . (11)
Let pSPR1 be the optimal price and assume that it will be high enough such that:
v¯ < vˇ (pSPR1) ⇐⇒ pSPR1 ≥ pL ≡ αv¯ + (1− α) c ≥ c. (12)
Then, whenever quality is non-conforming, we have v < v¯ < vˇ (pSPT ) implying that the
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buyer will choose termination. Hence, the seller’s expected payoff is:
USPR1 (e, p) ≡ α
∫
v¯
c
(v − c) Fv (v |e) dv +
∫
vh
v¯
(p− c) Fv (v |e) dv − e. (13)
Integrating by parts and partially differentiating with respect to e, gives us:
U ′
SPR1 (e, p) =
[
−α
∫
v¯
c
Fe (v |e) dv − 1
]
+ [pL − p]Fe (v¯ |e) . (14)
Given that e0 is the first-best investment decision, it follows from expression (14), as-
sumption 2 and the benchmark condition (2) that U ′
SPR1 (e0, pL) < 0. As U
′
SPR1 (e0, p)→
∞ > 0 for p → ∞ and observing that U ′
SPR1 (e0, p) is continuous in p, we can ar-
gue by the intermediate value theorem that there exists a price pSPR1 ∈ (pL,∞) such
that U ′
SPR1 (e0, pSPR1) = 0. As it follows from pSPR1 > pL and assumption 2 that
U ′′
SPR1 (e, pSPR1) < 0 for all e ≥ 0, investment decision e0 must be a global maximum
of the seller’s expected payoff function USPR1 (e, pSPR1). Hence, price pSPR1 induces
the first-best investment decision for v¯ ≥ c. (Note that assumption (12) is satisfied as
pSPR1 > pL). The extension of the result to threshold levels below variable cost, v¯ < c,
is relegated to Appendix B.
The intuition of the proof is as follows: If it were possible to always terminate and
ask for restitution, the seller would underinvest due to buyer hold-up. Indeed, his payoff
would be a (v − c) just as in the no-contract case. Yet, under SPR, termination is not
available if the seller’s tender is conforming to the contract. Indeed, if the seller produces
high quality, the contract is enforced, and the seller derives a payoff of p − c. Hence,
p− c acts as a quality premium for the seller. The higher this premium, the higher will
be the seller’s investment, as, by investing, he can increase the probability of exceeding
the quality threshold. Therefore, by choosing an appropriate price p, it is possible to
counterbalance the underinvestment effect due to hold-up.18 In fact, the regime works
like an incentive contract stipulating two different payoffs for the agent, depending on
whether the output is above or below some threshold level.
In order to enforce this regime, the court has to observe 1) the contract price, 2)
whether delivery took place, and 3) whether the value of the good exceeds the quality
18Note, however, that price will have to become extremly high for Fe (v¯ |·)→ 0. This will often be the
case for v¯ → vh and v¯ → 0.
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threshold. Obviously, the third requirement is the most problematic. It should be clear,
however, that less information is needed than under expectation damages where the whole
range of possible realizations of the tender’s value has to be verifiable. In our example,
the court would have to observe the exact value that the proposed motor design will
have to the manufacturer. Under SPR, it suffices that the court can observe whether the
prototype is better or worse than some arbitrarily chosen threshold.
A natural benchmark could be the quality of a reference product. Suppose that a
competitor already has his car on the market. Then it is clear that a prototype that does
not at least match this existing product should be deemed unsatisfactory. While it is
difficult, even for an expert, to assess the absolute value of some new design, it should be
relatively easy to assess whether it is better or worse than some well chosen benchmark.
This has an interesting implication for contracting: Parties can privately stipulate
breach remedies - and frequently do so for important projects. Yet, even then, they
will not normally design a mechanism from scratch but rather use basic legal remedies
which courts are familiar with.19 Our analysis suggests that the SPR regime might be
an attractive choice: It achieves the first best but, compared to the default expectation
damages regime, it lowers informational requirements.
Common law courts have, however, traditionally limited the parties’ power to privately
stipulate specific performance (Farnsworth, 2004, §12.7, p. 751). The same restrictions
generally apply for stipulating very high damage payments in the event of breach (liqui-
dated damages) on the ground that they indirectly achieve the same goal. The reason is
the "fundamental principle that the law’s goal on breach of contract is not to deter breach
by compelling the promisor to perform, but rather to redress breach by compensating the
promisee" (id, § 12.18 p. 811). The modern trend, however, is in favor of the extension
of specific performance (id, §12.4 p. 743). Revised article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code gives effect to such agreements. California amended §1671 of its Civil Code as early
as 1977, to make liquidated damages provisions valid.
Finally, it is inconceivable how courts should be able to verify whether a widget was
19As courts are specialized in ruling on standard breach remedies, enforcing them will probably be
reliable and relatively cheap (Che and Chung, 1999).
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traded or not, without being able to tell a widget from a non-widget. In other words, by
assuming that courts can observe whether trade has occurred or not, Che and Hausch
(1999) and other papers in the spirit of Hart and Moore (1988) implicitly assume that
courts are able to verify whether the good in question exceeds a certain minimal quality
threshold. Yet, as we have seen, this is enough for their “irrelevance of contracting result”
to no longer apply and, to even achieve first-best levels of cooperative investments. It
should, however, be mentioned that the problems identified in Che and Hausch (1999)
are likely to reappear, if quality is multidimensional and courts fail to take into account
all quality dimensions when deciding whether the good exceeds minimal quality. The
same is true if the production technology is captured by a density function which might
become zero for some values on the interval [0, vh].
20
6 Conclusion
Our paper makes the following three points: 1) The existing default legal regime of com-
mon law is already able to induce first-best cooperative investments. Hence, there is no
urgent need for privately stipulated remedies in order to induce cooperative investments.
2) If the contracting parties doubt whether the court possesses enough information to
apply expectation damages, they can create legal remedies of their own. Che and Chung
(1999) suggest that they use reliance damages. We argue that, in some cases, it is eas-
ier for courts to verify whether the buyer’s valuation exceeds some well-chosen quality
threshold than to verify the absolute value of the seller’s investment. Then, parties should
prefer a regime combining specific performance and restitution (SPR) over reliance dam-
ages. 3) In order to apply the SPR regime, no more information needs to be verifiable
than is implicitly assumed in Che and Hausch (1999).
Moreover, papers by Chung (1991), Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994) and Edlin
and Reichelstein (1996) have already argued that the specific performance remedy per-
forms very well in inducing relationship-specific investments of the selfish type. By show-
ing that a regime based on specific performance also provides first-best incentives for
20See expression (14). We owe the insight of this last paragraph to discussions with Patrick Schmitz
and Yeon-Koo Che.
19
cooperative investments, our analysis lends further support to the broader trend of ex-
panding the use of specific performance in common law. Specifically, it should be in the
power of the parties to enlarge the availability of specific performance by dispensing with
the adequacy test and other criteria for such relief.
Finally, it could be a promising avenue for future research to devise incentive schemes
by using common breach remedies of contract law as basic building blocks in optional
remedy regimes. With the notable exception of Avraham (2006) the opportunities offered
by the optional structure of real world legal regimes has so far largely been ignored.
20
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Figure 6: ED without renegotiation if the buyer is allowed to breach.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Allowing for buyer’s breach
7.1.1 ED without renegotiation
Rather than assuming ad hoc that the buyer never breaches the contract we will now
show that legal remedies of contract law induce the buyer to accept delivery.21
Conforming quality, v ≥ v¯. If quality is conforming non-acceptance
(
A¯
)
of the sup-
plier’s tender constitutes breach. Hence, the supplier can recover damages of [p −
c]+(Figure 6). Under the natural assumption that the price is set such that p ∈ (c, v¯), we
see that v − p > −[p − c]+ for all v ≥ v¯. Hence, the buyer will accept delivery in equi-
librium. Under the substantial performance doctrine, different remedies will be available
depending on whether the non-conformity amounts to total breach or not.
Non-conformity constitutes partial breach, vTB≤ v < v¯. If quality is non-conforming
it is less clear why the buyer should be obliged to accept delivery. Yet, if breach due to
non-conforming quality is non-material, vTB ≤ v ≤ v¯, the buyer is indeed only allowed to
21Although Che and Chung (1999) make the opposite simplifying assumption, namely, that the seller
never refuses to deliver, the underlying sequence of decisions is the same as in our paper. Obviously,
trade can only occur if the seller decides to deliver and the buyer decides to accept. Their analysis, like
ours, does not change by taking account of this extensive version of the game (see footnote 11 of their
paper). Also note, that it is straightforward to show that the timing of delivery and acceptance decisions
does not matter.
21
demand damages for partial breach. Therefore, if the buyer rejects delivery, the supplier
can recover the full price, minus cost saved, minus damages to which the buyer would have
been entitled: [p−c−(v¯−v)]+. For p ∈ (c, v¯), we see that v¯−p > 0 ≥ −[p−c−(v¯−v)]+.
Hence, the buyer will accept delivery in equilibrium.
Non-conformity constitutes total breach, v < vTB. If, however, the non-conformity
is material, v < vTB, the buyer can terminate the contract. In this case he can ask for
restitution (R) under which he can recover any progress payment that he might have
made to the seller. Both parties end up with 0 payoff as the good has no value to the
seller. Alternatively, the buyer can recover damages for total breach, [v¯− p]+. Assuming
that the parties will coordinate on the Pareto efficient equilibrium and p ∈ (c, v¯), the
buyer will accept for v − c > 0 and reject for v − c ≤ 0. It is optimal for the seller to
refuse to deliver if v − c ≤ 0. Hence, an equilibrium exists where the buyer will choose
acceptance on the equilibrium path.22
7.1.2 ED with renegotiation
If we assume that parties renegotiate towards the ex-post efficient trade decision, adjust-
ments to the payoffs in Figure 6 need to be made: If e.g. the buyer rejects the seller’s
tender, although trade is efficient v > c, parties will renegotiate splitting the resulting
surplus of v − c according to their respective bargaining power. Similarly the parties
will renegotiate if the buyer accepts the tender, although c ≤ v (Figure 7, note that
we continue to assume p ∈ (c, v¯)). If the tender is conforming, v ≥ v¯, the buyer will
accept in equilibrium as − (p− c) + (1− α) (v − c) = v − p − α (v − c) < v − p is true
for all p ∈ (c, p) and v¯ ≤ v. We make one additional assumption which is crucial: Under
the substantial performance doctrine of common law the buyer may only treat the non-
conformity as total breach if v < vTB. In civil law countries a similar provision requires
non-conformity to be “fundamental”. One test for concluding that non-conformity cannot
be treated as total breach is whether the buyer still has an “interest” in the good despite
non-conformity. We will assume that the court will conclude that such an interest exists
22There is of course another payoff equivalent equilibrium where the seller announces delivery and the
buyer rejects. Hence, strictly speaking, we have only established that we can model the game "as if" the
buyer always chooses acceptance.
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Figure 7: ED with renegotiation if the buyer is allowed to breach.
whenever the parties would freely renegotiate to trade: v > c. This implying setting
vTB = c. We distinguish two cases:
Non-conformity constitutes partial breach: c = vTB≤ v < v¯. As −[p − c − (v¯ −
v)]+ + α(v − c) < v¯ − p + (1− α) (v − c) < v¯ − p for all v ≥ c, it is always optimal for
the buyer to accept delivery.
Non-conformity constitutes total breach: v < vTB= c. As v¯−p+(1− α) (c− v) >
(v¯ − p) > 0 for v < c the buyer will always choose acceptance if given the choice. Antic-
ipating this decision by the buyer, the seller will choose to breach the contract.
7.2 Appendix B: Extension to v¯ ∈ (0, c).
Proof. Consider the case where the quality threshold is set below variable cost, v¯ < c.
Again, we assume that the optimal price is high enough such that
v¯ < vˇ (pSPR2) =⇒ pSPR2 > pL. (15)
This implies that the buyer will always choose termination if quality is non-conforming,
v < v¯. The seller’s payoff will then be 0. If quality is conforming but the buyer’s valuation
is below variable cost, v¯ ≤ v < c, the buyer will initially ask for specific performance but
then agrees to renegotiate towards the ex-post efficient trade decision. The seller’s payoff
is p− c+ α (c− v). If valuation is above variable cost, trade takes place as stipulated in
23
the contract and the seller’s payoff will be p− c. Hence, the seller’s expected payoff will
be:
USPR2 (e, p) ≡
∫
c
v¯
(p− c) + α (c− v) Fv (v |e) dv +
∫
vh
c
(p− c) Fv (v |e) dv − e. (16)
Integrating by parts and taking partial derivatives with respect to e, gives us:
U ′
SPR2 (e, p) = α
∫
c
v¯
Fe (v |e) dv − 1 + [pL − p]Fe (v¯ |e) . (17)
It follows from the benchmark condition (2) and Assumption 2 that U ′
SPR2 (e0, pL) < 0.
As U ′
SPR2 (e0, p) → ∞ > 0 for p → ∞ and observing that U
′
SPR2 (e0, p) is continuous in
p, it follows by the intermediate value theorem that there must exist a pSPR2 ∈ (pL,∞)
such that U ′
SPR2 (e0, pSPR2) = 0. In order for e0 to be a global maximum of the seller’s
expected payoff function, the following second order condition must hold for all e ≥ 0:
U ′′
SPR2 (e, pSPR2) = α
∫
c
v¯
Fee (v |e) dv + [pL − pSPR2]Fee (v¯ |e) < 0. (18)
Solving U ′
SPR2 (e0, pSPR2) = 0 for pSPR2 and inserting into (18) gives us:
α
∫
c
v¯
Fee (v |e) dv −
α
∫
c
v¯
Fe (v |e0 ) dv − 1
Fe (v¯ |e0 )
Fee (v¯ |e) < 0. (19)
Multiplying with Fe (v¯ |e0 ) and dividing by Fee (v¯ |e) and rearranging we get:∫
c
v¯
Fe (v¯ |e0 )
Fee (v¯ |e)
Fee (v |e)− Fe (v |e0 ) dv > −
1
α
. (20)
which we assume to hold true.
Remark 2 The assumption will always be fulfilled if the seller’s bargaining power a is
sufficiently low or if the quality threshold v¯ is only slightly lower than variable cost. In-
terestingly, it will also hold for sufficiently low(!) threshold levels, as Fe (v¯ |·) → 0 for
v¯ → 0. A sufficient condition for the assumption to hold true is that −Fe (v |e0 ) /Fee (v |·)
is non-decreasing in v ∈ [v¯, c). Then the integrand will be non-negative. This will e.g. be
the case for the class of separable distribution functions: F (v |e) = k (v) g (e)+h (v). An
explicit example would be the function F (v |e): [0, 10]× [0,∞]→ [0, 1] :
F (v |e) = v (10− v)
(
10−3
e+ 0, 1
)
+
( v
10
)3
. (21)
where Fe (v |0) → ∞ can be approximated by replacing 0, 1 with an ever lower positive
number.
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